Uma contribuição ao estudo da Ética em Lukács

Abstract

It is a master's degree dissertation whose main goal is to seek a way to answer the following question: it is possible to think about ethics without an ontology? The answer rests on a study of the György Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being. For this, is needed to reconstruct Lukács' intellectual trajectory with an attempt to respond to this question: who really was György Lukács? It is as if, in attempting to answer such a question, there are three presuppositions that constitute the intellectual evolution of Lukács, which is due to ruptures and continuities in terms of theoretical foundation. These three assumptions allow a response of the following kind to the question: Lukacs was a moral philosopher who never wrote an Ethics. In order to analysis the "labour" chapter of Ontology we can see a meta-theoretical assumption of a kind of human action social theory. It is only these assumptions that give the basis for diagnosing the genesis of essential properties in every social ontological: value and ought-be. Indeed, the genesis of these values begins, according to Lukács, through the act of “labour”. However, not all human actions are reduced schematically to the “labour” character. Therefore, in the retreat of the natural barriers end up appearing ontological properties increasingly social. Some, even, purely social. This would be the case of ethical values and of the “ought to be” in what concerned ethics in general. Founded on an ontology in which there is no antinomy between causality and teleology, nor between necessity and possibility, it can be concluded that in Lukács' Ontology there is a thesis of the no dichotomy between facts and values. In this way, it will not be unauthorized to emphasize that Lukacs's theoretical development concerns second-order reflections on ethics, that is, a meta-ethics. It follows, as will be seen, that it is impossible, in the order of Lukacsian thought, to think an ethics without a social ontology.