A teoria da ação e o mal-estar na civilização : nada há para a felicidade além do princípio do prazer?

Abstract

The research aims to analyze ethical-philosophical aspects regarding training and mental health based on the Aristotelian philosophical approach and psychoanalytic theory. In view of these two approaches, the possibility of theoretical compatibility between Aristotle's philosophy and the revolutionary psychoanalytic theory regarding the constitution of the psychic character, which deals with sanity and psychopathology, is investigated. Is it possible that the explanations about moral character in Aristotle and Freud converge into compatible theories that in some aspects complement each other on the structure and psychic development, both healthy and pathological? Average rational control of pleasures, habit formation and education of sensations and emotions can be directly related to mental health. Through the dialectical analysis of Aristotelian and Freudian theory, some common foundations are sought for understanding the mental condition and human character. Aristotelian theory establishes some concepts about ethical and dianoetic virtues, attributing to them the moderating function of appetites, affections and emotions as the first moral precepts for the individual to have a virtuous character. The condition established for these first capabilities consists of an ability of the individual-collective organism to take practical actions and through rational means that aim at the common good. Temperance is the virtuous moral disposition that makes the individual able to design the course with balance and harmony between passion and reason, aiming for the best ends of their desires. A virtuous life is also a primordial condition for community life, as the individual who develops the moral capacity to direct their desires and affections towards the best end and the common good may also need an ethical disposition called phronesis. The opposite of these dispositions are the lack of control and bad, sensitive and perceptive designs that confer pathological traits of vicious behavior, found in the intemperate and incontinent character. Vices tend to be obstacles to other dianoetic dispositions, practical and scientific wisdom. The compulsive character, for example, tends to repeat deliberate bad actions. Aristotelian ethics advocates ethical virtues and dianoethics as conditions for the acquisition of the common good and the highest, a happy life. In contemporary literature it is possible to infer the condition of how this disposition to addiction, already mentioned in ancient Greek philosophy, can be constituted. Freudian psychoanalysis highlights, through its analytical observation of behavior and speech, some forms that reflect the condition of emotional and affective suffering and compulsive actions. What is attributed to the condition of suffering is what in psychoanalysis was called a symptom and the passive and active agent is a condition of what the psychoanalyst called neurosis. The origins of these conditions of suffering are symptomatic evidence that acts through the repetition of sensitive perceptions and affective relationships that require to be elaborated emotionally and consciously. [resumo fornecido pelo autor]