A primazia do justo sobre o bem : as críticas de Rawls ao utilitarismo

Abstract

The dissertation is to investigate claims specifically Rawlsian idea of the primacy of the right over the good, explaining, the basis of this concept, the critique of Rawls addressed to utilitarianism as a moral theory comprehensively. We seek to show that Rawls's assumption that utilitarianism is presented as a comprehensive moral theory which aims to present a general criterion (the principle of the greatest happiness, well- being, pleasure...) that applies to a broad spectrum issues (if not almost all issues). The Rawlsian view, in a society marked by a pluralism of comprehensive conceptions of the good, which, in most cases, have profound and irreconcilable differences, the utilitarian theory does not lend itself as a criterion for resolving moral dilemmas and political. It needs to find a set of principles capable of providing a common point of view from which it is possible to mediate contentious disputes arising from these different conceptions. In this case, the primacy of the right over the good in Rawls' theory has the sense that the principles of justice does not presuppose any particular conception of the good and that they put limits to the ways of life in which citizens can engage in conduct conceptions of the good they believe to be true.