O corpo-próprio e os fenômenos originários: da constituição fenomenológica em Husserl à experiência perceptiva em Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

This philosophical research seeks to describe the body and perceptual phenomena in the constitution of being-in-the-world. In phenomenology, lived experience reveals meaning and background as essential elements for understanding the constitution of experience in its originary phenomena. Within lived experience, the body is disclosed as a phenomenon constituted throughout the course of life. Therefore, this study seeks to understand the manner in which the lived body, a Merleau-Pontian concept, is constituted in experience, based on the hypothesis that the body cannot be reduced to an object of consciousness. From this perspective, the following question is proposed: considering Husserl's notion of phenomenon and Merleau-Ponty's conception of the lived body, what contributions do these perspectives offer to the understanding of apprehension in the body? This research demonstrates the constitution of the lived body in itself, considering the Husserlian epoché as a phenomenological resource for understanding the way of apprehending the world. This dissertation focuses on a phenomenological-existential investigation grounded in Husserl's later works and in Phenomenology of Perception by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Even in contemporary thought, there remain epistemic currents that preserve Cartesian reductionism in the relation between subject and object, shaping the understanding of the body through causal explanations. However, the research found that modern bodily conceptions distance themselves from the originary relations of lived experience in the body's own constitution. According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the lived body is constituted within affective, corporeal, and existential dimensions, supporting perceptual openness in the pre-reflective field. Thus, the study suggests thinking the body through its affective and existential dimensions within its own phenomenological structure, in opposition to objectivist conceptions of corporeality. [resumo fornecido pelo autor]