A simpatia em David Hume e seu papel para a moralidade

Abstract

This dissertation addresses the function of sympathy for ethics today from a critical analysis of David Hume's theory. The intention was to explain the concept of sympathy and its influence on ethics. To do so, David Hume's sentimentalism will be explored, and the ability to make moral distinctions based on feelings of approval and esteem or disapproval and guilt will be analyzed. For this, at first, the analysis of David Hume's theory of mind was carried out, to then analyze the questions regarding the morality proposed by the author. Bearing in mind the main objective of determining whether sympathy is an essential element for the construction of morality and what kind of moral theory Hume is committed to, we start with the following research problem: should we give a negative valuation to sympathy in the What concerns their influence on moral decision-making? Based on this, the hypothesis was elaborated: sympathy, considered from the point of view of emotions, perceptions and sensations, has (or does not have) an important role in making decisions of a moral nature. The investigation method used was the critical analysis of David Hume's theory, through interpretative qualitative research, whose bases were elaborated from the techniques pertinent to bibliographical research. It was concluded that sympathy has an undeniable application in ethical discussion and social morality, with strong evidence of the construction of morality as a social mechanism. [resumo fornecido pelo autor]