A teoria da coisa julgada ambiental nas ações individuais e coletivas: a possibilidade de rediscussão do caso julgado prejudicial ao meio ambiente

Abstract

Currently, with the goal of achieving a balance between economic development and environmental preservation, mechanisms and tools are being developed. Undoubtedly, environmental law is one of these tools, whether acting in a preventive manner, in order to prevent damages from occurring, or in a reparatory manner, by applying sanctions and penalties to violators of environmental standards. The possibility of (re)discussion of the decisions carried over and, therefore, covered by the mantle of res judicata is a controversial issue for legal operators, since it undoubtedly affects legal certainty, which is one of the pillars of the Democratic State of Right. However, in the environmental field, it is necessary to take into account other norms and constitutional principles, so that it may be necessary to restate the res judicata, especially when some decision is incompatible with the federal constitution, thus prevailing the principle of supremacy of the constitution, as well as the right to an ecologically balanced environment. This is, in particular, a collision of fundamental rights. The objective of the study is to evaluate and punctuate the aspects that permeate the theory of the thing judged in environmental law, in order to analyze the hermeneutics about the so-called relativization of the judged thing. It will also be evaluated the possibility of rediscussing the case that is prejudicial to the environment with the scope of making effective judicial protection. This is a relevant topic and of important repercussion in the environmental area. The study is developed from the perspective of constitutional, environmental and procedural principles, as well as doctrine and jurisprudence. The method used is the deductive and the approach is qualitative. Also, as technical procedures, the bibliographic, jurisprudential, documentary and hermeneutical methods will be used. The research considered the need of the judiciary to adopt a more cautious rationality when the good to be protected is the environment, in such a way that the thing judged can not be an obstacle to its effective protection, that is, it can not be the justification for protect the right to pollute or degrade the environment in perpetuity.